NATO-Russia Escalation Could Unleash China's Ruthless Grab for Taiwan

Howard Lutnick, U.S. Secretary of Commerce on Bloomberg TV on September 5, 2025, where he explicitly dismisses India's strategic value to the US by calling it the "vowel between Russia and China" in BRICS (i.e., the "I" in BRICS, implying it's just a filler or insignificant link enabling closer Russia-China ties). This directly undermines the long-standing US narrative of India as a key counterweight to China and ally in the Indo-Pacific.

Lutnick's remarks came amid escalating US-India trade tensions, following Trump's 50% tariffs on Indian goods (including penalties for Russian oil imports) and Modi's attendance at the SCO summit in China. Lutnick's tone was dismissive and coercive, warning India to "pick a side" or face economic isolation, echoing broader Trump administration frustration with India's neutral stance on Russia and China.

Key Excerpts from the Bloomberg TV Interview

Here's the relevant content from Lutnick's discussion (transcribed and summarized from multiple reports; full video available on Bloomberg's site):

On India's Alignment with Russia/China:

"What we've lost is that India doesn't yet want to open their market, stop buying Russian oil... And stop being a part of BRICS, right? They're the vowel between Russia and China. If that's who you want to be, go be it. But either support the dollar, support the United States of America, support your biggest client—who is the American consumer—or I guess you're going to pay a 50 percent tariff. And let's see how long this lasts."

Dismissing India's Defiance as Temporary:

"So, I think yes, in a month or two months, I think India is going to be at the table, and they're going to say they're sorry, and they're going to try to make a deal with Donald Trump. And it will be on Donald Trump's desk how he wants to deal with [Prime Minister] Modi, and we leave that to him."

Criticism of India's Russian Oil Purchases:

"Before the Russian conflict, India bought less than 2 percent of its oil from Russia and now they're buying 40 percent... The Indians have just decided, 'Ah, the heck with it. Let's buy it cheap and make a ton of money.' But you know what? That is just plain wrong. They either need to decide which side they want to be on."

This rhetoric portrays India not as a vital strategic partner against China (a view promoted by previous US administrations via initiatives like the Quad), but as a opportunistic "vowel" enabling adversarial alliances—effectively dismissing its role as a counterweight.

Lutnick's "vowel" metaphor is a blunt dismissal of India's geopolitical utility, similar in spirit to calling the counterweight idea "bullshit." It rejects the notion that India is a reliable Indo-Pacific ally, instead framing it as a BRICS enabler for Russia and China. The interview aired on a major US business news network (Bloomberg TV) during peak tensions.

Related Trump Statements: Hours before Lutnick's appearance, Trump posted on Truth Social: "Looks like we’ve lost India and Russia to deepest, darkest China. May they have a long and prosperous future together!" This amplified the theme of India "lost" as a counter to China.

With such statements comming out of America against India and its role in Indo-Pacific or counterweight to China. It seems US current administration is least interested in having India as an ally in Indo-Pacific or elsewhere.

Long term Effect of Such statements and U.S. policy shift towards India:

In the volatile geopolitical landscape of September 2025, the specter of a direct NATO-Russia confrontation looms large over Europe, fueled by ongoing escalations in the Ukraine war. Russian drone incursions into Polish airspace, the Zapad-2025 exercises with Belarus, and NATO's "Eastern Sentry" initiative signal a precarious brinkmanship that could erupt into full-scale conflict. Amid this turmoil, the Indo-Pacific remains a powder keg, with China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) conducting over 2,700 aerial incursions into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) this year alone. A NATO-Russia war would stretch Western alliances thin, creating a rare window of opportunity for Beijing to pursue its long-stated goal of "reunifying" Taiwan. Assuming India's neutrality in the Indo-Pacific theater, a plausible stance given New Delhi's doctrine of strategic autonomy. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi's third term, India has recalibrated its foreign policy to navigate U.S. tariffs, Chinese border tensions, and Russian mediation offers without committing to formal alliances. By staying on the sidelines—focusing on domestic defense manufacturing and economic diversification away from Beijing—India would deprive the U.S.-led Quad (comprising the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India) of a critical counterweight. This neutrality amplifies China's strategic leverage, allowing the PLA to concentrate forces without the threat of Indian Ocean disruptions or Himalayan diversions.The question is not merely if such a scenario favors China, but how profoundly it reshapes the calculus of invasion feasibility, capture timelines, and Western countermeasures. Drawing on recent official statements, military assessments, and expert analyses. For China, the alignment of distractions could transform a high-risk amphibious assault into a calculated gamble; for the U.S. and Europe, it would impose agonizing trade-offs between Atlantic security and Pacific deterrence. With India's hands-off approach, the odds tilt further toward Beijing, underscoring the interconnected fragility of 21st-century great-power rivalries.

Strategic Favorability: A Perfect Storm for Beijing's Ambitions

A NATO-Russia war would represent a geopolitical "perfect storm" for China, diverting U.S. and allied resources westward while exposing vulnerabilities in the Indo-Pacific. Russia's "no-limits" partnership with Beijing, formalized in February 2022, has evolved into a symbiotic axis of revisionism. Moscow's actions in Ukraine—now spilling into NATO territory via drones and hybrid tactics—would compel the alliance to mobilize, pulling American carrier strike groups, air assets, and intelligence from the Pacific. U.S. European Command's top general, Gen. Christopher Cavoli, highlighted this risk in July 2025, urging NATO to prepare for a "two-front conflict" where Russia launches opportunistic strikes to aid a Chinese Taiwan operation.

In this calculus, Russia's depleted but resilient forces—bolstered by North Korean munitions and Iranian drones—could tie down NATO in the Baltics or Black Sea, buying Beijing precious weeks.India's neutrality exacerbates this asymmetry. As the world's most populous nation and a nuclear power with a rapidly modernizing navy, India has historically checked Chinese expansionism through Quad engagements and the Andaman and Nicobar Command, which overlooks key Malacca Strait chokepoints.

With U.S. tariffs straining bilateral trade and Modi prioritizing self-reliance via "Make in India" for defense tech, India is unlikely to intercede militarily. This hands-off posture frees China from dual-front fears—along the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh or in the Indian Ocean—allowing the PLA to allocate 80% of its naval assets to the Taiwan Strait. Economically, the scenario is equally propitious. A NATO-Russia clash would spike global energy prices, as seen in Ukraine's early phases, but China's oil imports from Russia (up 20% in 2025) insulates it from sanctions blowback.

Meanwhile, Western economies—already reeling from Trump's 100% tariffs on BRICS nations—would face compounded inflation, eroding public support for distant Pacific commitments. Beijing's intent here is clear: Xi Jinping's May 2025 assertion of Taiwan's "legal reunification" under the Anti-Secession Law emphasizes "peaceful" means but reserves force, framing it as a domestic imperative amid external "containment."

Subtle signals, like the PLA's dual-carrier deployment to the Strait in June 2025 amid London "negotiations," suggest testing resolve while Russia distracts.

From a deterrence standpoint, the favorability is stark.

With U.S. forces split (e.g., 60% of Pacific Fleet redeployed to Europe), China's hypersonic DF-17 missiles and J-20 stealth fighters gain unopposed windows. Speculations that Russia's Polish incursions are "provocations to greenlight Taiwan seems picking news trends.

Intel leaks reported in April 2025 claimed CCP elites believe a distracted U.S. under Trump "will be unwilling or unable" to intervene, prompting invasion timelines.

In sum, the scenario elevates China's operational freedom by 40-50%, where Russian distracting movement reduce U.S. intervention odds from 70% to under 40%.

Sidelining India by Trump Adminstration increases India's neutrality sealing this advantage, transforming a risky solo endeavor into a coordinated great-power play.

Feasibility of Invasion and Capture: From Gray Zone to Green Light

China's invasion of Taiwan—an amphibious nightmare across 100 miles of contested waters—remains one of the most complex military operations imaginable, yet a NATO-Russia war could render it surprisingly feasible. The PLA has amassed formidable capabilities: 2.5 million active troops, 370 warships (surpassing the U.S. Navy), and amphibious assault ships like the Type 075 that could ferry 30,000 marines in waves.

Beijing's 2027 modernization target, reiterated by U.S. officials, aims for invasion readiness, but 2025 exercises (e.g., Joint Sword-2025A) simulate blockades and seizures with eerie precision.

Geographically, the Strait's typhoon-prone monsoon season (June-November) traditionally deters crossings, but climate shifts and PLA weather tech mitigate this. Capture would unfold in phases: cyber/EMP strikes to blind Taiwan's command (already compromised by 2025 infiltrations at the National Security Council level), followed by missile barrages neutralizing airfields, then heliborne assaults on key ports like Taoyuan.

Taiwan's 170,000 troops and asymmetric defenses—Javelins, Stingers, and U.S.-supplied Harpoons—could inflict 10,000+ PLA casualties in week one, per CSIS wargames. Yet, with NATO tying U.S. B-2 bombers and F-35s in Europe, China's A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) bubbles expand unchallenged.

India's non-interference on Chinese Border or in Oceans eases logistics immensely and Military stregth for Taiwan Invasion. Without Indian submarines shadowing PLA supply lines or QUAD patrols in the Bay of Bengal, China could surge 200,000 troops via rail from Fujian Province unmolested. A War on the Rocks analysis from July 2025 notes India's pivot to "options, not sides" via domestic arms production (e.g., Tejas jets, BrahMos missiles) prioritizes Himalayan deterrence over Pacific adventures.

This neutrality echoes India's 2025 India-Pakistan skirmishes, where lessons on rapid escalation informed Taiwan's playbook but without direct aid commitments.

Ease of capture hinges on speed: Beijing needs Taipei secured in 72 hours to preempt U.S. mobilization. Ukraine's quagmire—where Russia's 190,000 troops stalled against 500,000 defenders—looms as a cautionary tale, with CIA Director William Burns noting in June 2025 that Xi is "learning lessons" on attrition and sanctions.

A NATO distraction buys that window:

Russian strikes on Baltic pipelines or cyber ops against NATO grids (as in Putin's 2025 hybrid escalation) force U.S. cyber commands eastward.

Feasibility jumps from "low" (20% success rate in baseline CSIS models) to "moderate" (45-60%), especially if gray-zone tactics—like the 27-jet swarm on September 8, 2025—escalate to blockade.

PLA Navy Commander Dong Jun's August 2025 vow to "resolutely crush separatism" signals doctrinal shifts toward rapid dominance, not prolonged occupation.

Capture isn't assured—Taiwan's terrain favors guerrillas—but in this scenario, it's easier than ever, potentially concluding in months rather than years.

Challenges for U.S. and Europe:

A Tale of Divided LoyaltiesFor the U.S. and Europe, aiding Taiwan amid a NATO-Russia inferno would be an exercise in strategic paralysis, demanding impossible choices between hemispheres. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) already warns of asset shifts: shifting carriers from Yokosuka to the Mediterranean could leave Guam exposed, as Stars and Stripes reported on September 9, 2025. With 100,000 troops committed to Europe (up 20% post-Zapad), resupplying Taiwan's HIMARS or F-16s becomes logistically nightmarish— convoys vulnerable to Houthi-style interdictions in the Red Sea, now a Russian proxy theater.Europe's burden is heavier still. NATO's July 2025 summit pledged Indo-Pacific partnerships (Japan, Australia), but Rutte's admissions reveal strains: "We're going to need everything" for dual fronts.

India's neutrality compounds isolation: without QUAD logistics, U.S. resupply via Diego Garcia falters, forcing riskier Philippine basing amid Duterte-era ambivalence.

Subtle challenges: Russia's "junkyard dog" role—missile tests near Alaska to scatter U.S. forces—mirrors 2025 simulations where Beijing times Strait closure to NATO Article 5 invocations. Chinese don’t think the US can fight a two-front war.

For Washington and Brussels, response hardens into triage: defend the homeland first, Taiwan second—potentially dooming the island to fait accompli.

The hardness is profound: intervention odds plummet 30%, per Taylor & Francis models, turning aid into symbolic gestures.

Xi's rhetoric— "reunification is inevitable" (May 2025)—masks opportunistic intent, with Wang Yi's July drop of "pretenses" viewing Ukraine as a "blessing" for Pacific focus.